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A GENEROUSLY FLUCTUATING SCALE OF




ESIDENT aliens are persons who lawfully and permanently reside
in the United States, but are not United States citizens. This Com-
ment examines the relationship of resident aliens to the free speech
protections of the First Amendment through the jurisprudence of the
Supreme Court. Since the conclusion of the nineteenth century, the
Supreme Court has made various and contradictory pronouncements re-
garding this relationship. The result and its effect upon resident aliens'
claims to First Amendment protections is elusive. Most Justices of the
Supreme Court have agreed that resident aliens' speech activities are pro-
tected by the First Amendment in the same manner as citizens' activities.
Most Supreme Court Justices have also agreed that in some contexts resident
aliens' First Amendment protections are limited in ways that citizens' pro-
tections could not be limited.
The most important area in which these protections have been limited is
when Congress enacts legislation directly curtailing permissible speech activ-
ities of resident aliens by providing for the deportation and denial of natural-
ization to resident aliens engaging in certain activities. The Supreme Court
has shown extreme deference to Congress in this area by relying upon a
conception of the nation state which is grounded in late nineteenth century
international law and describes the power to expel any alien, at any time, for
any reason, as unlimited. The Court has also employed a compact theory in
order to deny resident aliens' Constitutional rights. Under this theory, only
those who are citizens are parties to the Constitution and thus entitled to its
protections. Alternating with the compact theory, the territoriality theory
* This title is drawn from two sources. The term "fluctuate" was used to refer to the
diminished First Amendment protections available to resident aliens in the foreign
affairs/immigration area. Michael Scaperlanda, The Domestic Fourth Amendment Rights of
Aliens: To What Extent Do They Survive, United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 56 Mo. L. REV.
213, 238 (1991). The phrase "generous and ascending scale of rights" was used by Justice
Jackson in Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950) to describe the increasing claim to
Constitutional protections which resident aliens have as they move toward citizenship. Id.
"Mere lawful presence in the country creates an implied assurance of safe conduct and gives
him certain rights; they become more extensive and secure when he makes preliminary
declaration of intention to become a citizen, and they expand to those of full citizenship upon
naturalization." Id.
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has also been proposed: that the Constitution applies to all persons within
the territory of the United States. A third theory is that the Constitution
applies to limit actions by the United States government in general, without
regard to the location of affected individuals. Under the compact theory,
resident aliens' entitlement to Constitutional protections increases as their
connection to the United States increases. Resident aliens thus occupy a
shifting middle ground between full Constitutional protection and complete
denial of Constitutional protection. This middle ground is unstable, how-
ever, and matters of foreign policy and national security frequently intrude
to decrease resident aliens' Constitutional protections. The deterioration of
resident aliens' First Amendment Rights in the national security context is
most graphically conveyed by the following statement made by former re-
gional counsel for the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) in San Francisco to justify the deportation of resident aliens for speech
activities in support of a suspected terrorist group: "Do we wait for these
people to blow up the federal building?"1
This Comment addresses the constitutional structure that allows the pre-
clusion and limitation of First Amendment protection for resident aliens'
speech activities in immigration proceedings. 2 The first part of this Com-
ment analyzes the development of resident aliens' claims to Constitutional
protections in the late nineteenth century. This section is not a comprehen-
sive history3 but is instead an examination of the development of theories
justifying the expulsion of resident aliens. The discussion begins with several
cases resulting from the Chinese Exclusion Act 4 and subsequent legislation
of the 1880's. 5 These cases present attempts at the exclusion and restriction
of aliens for international and domestic economic purposes.6 The use of the
category of "resident alien" to deport long term non-citizens for activities
protected by the First Amendment will then be addressed. Foreign policy
exclusions in the twentieth century have primarily had an ideological basis.
Throughout this century, noncitizens have been subject to deportation or
denial of naturalization due to political beliefs perceived to be contrary to
1. Micheal J. Ybarra, Domestic Dilemma: Long Effort to Deport Terror Suspects Raises
Difficult Rights Issues, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 1991, at Al, A4 (quoting William B. Oden-
crantz, Former INS Regional Counsel, San Francisco in 1987).
2. See David Cole, The 1952 McCarren- Walter Act.- Is it Irrelevant in Today's World?,
NAT'L L.J., May 29, 1989, at 22.
3. For the history of Congressional authority over immigration, see Hiroshi Motomura,
Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statu-
tory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990); Gerald L. Nueman, Whose Constitution?, 100
YALE L.J. 909 (1991). Materials addressing the history of the exclusion and expulsion of
immigrants are numerous. See, e.g., Mitchell C. Tilner, Ideological Exclusion ofAliens: The
Evolution ofa Policy, 2 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1 (1987), and authorities cited therein.
4. Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58; Act of Sept. 13, 1888, ch. 1015, 25 Stat. 476
(repealed 1943).
5. E.g., Act of Oct. 1, 1888, ch. 1064, 25 Stat. 504 (repealed 1943).
6. See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 582-95 (1889). The United
States and China began with an open immigration policy. Id. Economic pressures on the
western coast of the United States intensified, however, because of the influx of immigrants.
Id. Congress began to pass restrictive legislation in the 1880's to reduce the number of Chinese
immigrants to the United States. Id.
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United States policy. The McCarren-Walter Act of 19527 represents the
most memorable codification of provisions the entry and providing future
deportation of noncitizens because of membership or affiliation with various
political organizations, most notably the Communist Party.
8
The second part of this Comment examines the form that these concerns
have taken during the 1980's. The focus is deportation and denial of natu-
ralization because of membership in or affiliation with organizations sus-
pected of involvement in terrorist activity. Exclusion for terrorist activity
can be seen as an outgrowth of the much criticized ideological exclusions
codified in the 1950's. The enactment of Section 9019 in 1987 extended First
Amendment protections to all aliens within the United States. 10 Section
901, however, contained important exceptions to constitutional protections:
it did not apply to those suspected of terrorist activity, members of the PLO,
and persons adverse to foreign policy.1 1 Additionally, Section 901 was
amended in 1988 to apply only to non-immigrants. 12 Thus, Congress with-
drew the constitutional protections of Section 901 for immigrants, those
wishing to enter and remain within the United States, while retaining these
protections for those not wishing to remain, short term visitors and other
non-immigrants.
The final section examines the foreign policy and terrorist exclusions as
codified in the Immigration Act of 1990, passed on November 29, 1990 and
effective October 1, 1991.13 The practical effect of this Act is unknown be-
cause of its recent passage. Thus, this discussion will be more speculative.
Regulations implementing the Act are still being issued and much of the
machinery of the McCarren-Walter Act must be dismantled. Particularly
troublesome is the Visa Lookout System which contains over 300,000 names
of persons, including resident aliens, considered to be excludable under the
McCarren-Walter Act.14 Although legislation has been passed providing for
the removal of names of persons who are no longer excludable under the
1990 Act,' 5 the deadline has been extended due to the enormity of the task
of separating the excludable from the non-excludable. 16 The recent use of
the 1990 Act's terrorist provision to seek the deportation of two resident
aliens 17 demonstrates how its provisions can be employed in as broad a man-
7. Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163. (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-
1524 (1988)) (prior to amendment by Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat.
4978 (1990)).
8. Id. § 212(a)(28)(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(27)(1988)).
9. Pub. L. No. 100-204 § 901, 101 Stat. 1331, 1399-1400 (1987) (amended 1988) (re-




13. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (codified in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C.A.).




17. Ybarra, supra note 1, at A4.
19921
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ner as the exclusionary provisions of McCarren-Walter Act were.18 These
individuals were first charged under the McCarren-Walter Act's ideological
provisions. Although Section 901 was enacted soon after deportation pro-
ceedings were begun, its protection was unavailable to them because they
were charged with membership in a terrorist organization. 19 When the Mc-
Carren-Walter Act provisions were struck down as unconstitutional by a
federal district court, new charges were brought under the 1990 Act charg-
ing the individuals with providing material support to a terrorist
organization.
I. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN CITIZENS AND NON-CITIZENS IN THE
DENIAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS
A. Exclusivity of Congressional Control Over Immigration
Congressional authority over immigration is implied from Article I, sec-
tion 8, clause 4 of the Constitution, which provides that Congress should
"establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization .... ",20 The Supreme Court
has described Congress' implied power of exclusion as based on "ancient
principles of the international law of nation-states .... ,,21 This power is
"inherent in sovereignty, necessary for maintaining normal international re-
lations and defending the country against foreign encroachments and dan-
gers-a power to be exercised exclusively by the political branches of
government .... "22
The Supreme Court has held that Congress' exercise of power over immi-
gration through the implementation of policies excluding and providing con-
18. See American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Messe, 714 F. Supp. 1060 (C.D.
Cal. 1989), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v.
Thornburgh, 940 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1991); infra notes 185-240 and accompanying text.
19. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 714 F. Supp. at 1064.
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; see Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 506 n.25
(1981).
21. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765 (1972). Kleindienst involved a First
Amendment challenge by the United States citizens to the Attorney General's refusal to waive
the denial of a temporary visa to Mandel, a nonresident alien, on the basis of advocacy of
communism. The Court held that First Amendment interests would not be balanced against
the Executive's exercise of Congress' plenary power to exclude aliens as long as this power was
exercised "on the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason .... Id at 770. At least
one commentator has interpreted this decision as offering a lowered standard of First Amend-
ment protection for citizens as well as aliens. Scaperlanda, supra note *, at 239 n.144.
22. Id. at 765 (citing Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 609; Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 698.
Recent developments in the international customary law of migration suggest that the right of
the nation state to exclude or expel aliens is not absolute. Timothy R. Hager, Recognizing the
Judicial and Arbitral Rights ofAliens to Review Consular Refusals of "E" Visas, 66 TUL. L.R.
203, 222-24 (1991). "According to customary international law, a state may legitimately ex-
clude aliens only if, 'individually or collectively, they pose a danger to its public safety, secur-
ity, welfare or essential institutions of the state.' " Id. at 222-23 (quoting James A. R.
Nafziger, A Commentary on American legal Scholarship Concerning the Admission of Migrants,
17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 165, 166 (1984)). States may also "have a qualified duty to admit
aliens." Id. at 222-23 (citing SELECT COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY:
U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST 762 (1981). States' rights to ad-
mit and exclude aliens are also affected by international agreements. Id. at 223-24. For a
general discussion of this topic, see id. at 222-24 and cited authorities.
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ditions for the entry of aliens is a political question and thus not subject to
judicial review. 23 The Court has also interpreted the formulation and en-
forcement of policies regarding the entry and continued presence of aliens
within the United States as the exclusive province of Congress, subject only
to the procedural protections of due process. 24
B. Expulsionary Legislation and Deportation Applied to Resident Aliens in
the Late Nineteenth Century
United States policy toward aliens wishing to enter the country was open
with little or no restriction placed upon immigration until the latter part of
the nineteenth century. 25 For example, in 1868, the United States adopted
provisions to its treaty with China that provided for free emigration between
the two countries.26 The primary motive for this treaty was commercial; it
provided that the citizens of each country would be allowed the rights of the
citizens of the other.27 The treaty recognized "the inherent and inalienable
right of man to change his home and allegiance .... "28 It also recited the
"mutual advantage of the free migration and emigration of their citizens and
subjects respectively. from one country to the other for purposes of curiosity,
of trade, or as permanent residents."' 29 A supplement to the treaty in 1880
provided that the citizens of each country would receive all the rights and
privileges of citizens when within the other's country.30 California received
the bulk of the Chinese immigrants who arrived to participate in the gold
23. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 796 (1977).
The conditions of entry for every alien, the particular classes of aliens that shall
be denied entry altogether, the basis for determining such classification, the right
to terminate hospitality to aliens, the grounds on which such determination shall
be based, have been recognized as matters solely for the responsibility of Con-
gress and wholly outside the power of this court to control.
Id. (quoting Harisiades, 342 U.S. 580, 596-97 (1952)). "Congress alone has the constitutional
authority to prescribe rules for naturalization, and the courts' task is to assure compliance
.Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 506.
[T]he right to exclude or expel aliens, or any class of aliens, absolutely or upon
certain conditions, in war or in peace, is an inherent and inalienable right of
every sovereign and independent nation; that the power of Congress to expel,
like the power to exclude, aliens or any class of aliens from the country, may be
exercised entirely through executive officers....
Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 232 (1896) (citing Fong Yue Ting v. United States,
149 U.S. 698 (1893)). For an historical analysis of the plenary power doctrine, see Motomura,
supra note 3, at 545.
24. Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 767 (quoting Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531-32 (1954)).
25. Only two laws restricting immigration were passed prior to 1875. The first was the
Alien and Sedition Act of 1798 and an 1862 Act prohibiting the importation of Chinese slave
labor. Tilner, supra note 3, at 14. (citing Aliens' Act of 1798, ch.58, 15 Stat. 570; Act of
February 19, 1862, ch. 27, 12 Stat. 240. See Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 761; Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588 n.15 (1952); Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 715, 746-50; Chae
Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 582-95 (1889).
26. See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 592-93 for a discussion of additional articles adopted
to the treaty between the United States and China.
27. Id. at 592.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Treaty Between the United States and China Concerning Immigration, November 17,
1880, 22 Stat. 826-237.
1992]
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rush. 3 1 Initially, the U.S. Government felt this immigration to be benefi-
cial.32 Increasing numbers of immigrants, however, placed economic pres-
sures upon the western coast of the United States as the immigrants with
citizens competed for employment.3 3 Under political pressure from the
states, Congress passed legislation in 188434 regulating the presence of Chi-
nese laborers in the United States. 35 In 1891, Congress provided for limita-
tions on the entry of new Chinese laborers and for deportation of unlawfully
present aliens within one year of their entry. 36
C. Judicial Review of Congress' Measures to Restrict the Presence and
Expel Non-Citizens: The Birth of the Citizen Resident Alien
Distinction
Judicial review of Congressional enactments expelling resident aliens from
the United States began with Chae Chan Ping v. United States.37 Chae Chan
Ping was a Chinese laborer and lived in San Francisco from 1875 through
1887. In 1887 he left the United States. Upon his return later that year he
was unable to reenter the United States although he had received a certifi-
cate entitling him to return under the Restriction Act of 1882.38 Chae Chan
Ping was refused entry because, in his absence, Congress had passed an act
abrogating the certificate. 39 Chae Chan Ping challenged the law as conflict-
ing with the treaty between the United States and China and as a deprivation
of a vested right. The new registration in effect, provided for the expulsion
of Chinese laborers, as it did not permit them to leave the United States and
31. Id. at 594.
32. Id. at 592-93.
33. Id. at 595. The Court explained
[i]t seemed impossible for them to assimilate to our people or to make any
change in their habits or modes of living. As they grew in numbers each year
the people of the coast saw, or believed they saw, in the facility of immigration,
and in the crowded millions of China, where population presses upon the means
of subsistence, great danger that at no distant day that portion of our country
would be overrun by them unless prompt action was taken to restrict their
immigration.
Id.
34. Act of July 5, 1884, ch. 220, 23 Stat. 115-18 (repealed by Act of Dec. 17, 1943, ch.
344, § 1, 57 Stat. 600).
35. See Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 588 n.15; Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 715-23.
36. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 551, § 10, 26 Stat. 1084, 1086 (1891); see Harisiades, 342
U.S. at 588 n.15.
37. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 602. Section 13 of the Chinese Exclusion Act was
passed on September 13, 1888. Ch. 1015, § 13, 25 Stat. 476 (repealed 1943). Section 13
provided:
[t]hat any Chinese person, or person of Chinese descent, found unlawfully in the
United States, or its Territories, may be arrested upon a warrant issued upon a
complaint, under oath, filed by any party on behalf of the United States .... and
when convicted, upon a hearing, and found and adjudged to be one not lawfully
entitled to be or remain in the United States, such person shall be removed from
the United States to the country whence he came.
Id.
38. Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (repealed 1943).
39. Law of Oct. 1, 1888, ch. 1064, 25 Stat. 504.
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return.40 Justice Story's opinion for the majority found that Chae Chan
Ping had not acquired any right to reenter the United States.4 1 Justice Story
emphasized the United States' power as sovereign to exclude aliens at will.42
According to Justice Story, the power to exclude inhered in sovereignty and
was necessary to ensure the safety and security of the nation.4 3 The opinion
asserted that the power to expel aliens was also derived from the sovereignty
of the nation and could be used at any time to expel dangerous persons from
its territories. 44
In Fong Yue Ting,45 the validity of the Registration Act of May 5, 189246
was challenged. Section 6 of the Registration Act required all Chinese la-
borers lawfully within the United States to apply within one year to the dis-
trict collector of internal revenue for a certificate of residence.4 7
Noncompliance with the registration requirement caused a Chinese laborer
to be deemed to be unlawfully within the United States and therefore subject
to arrest and deportation. 48 Three plaintiffs challenged the Act as a viola-
tion of the Fifth Amendment guarantee of due process of law and therefore
unconstitutional. The Supreme Court upheld Section 6 as a valid exercise of
the absolute sovereign right to exclude or expel aliens and stated that this
right may be exercised solely through executive officials.49 The court stated
that:
[E]very sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and
essential to self preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within
its dominions, or to admit them only in such cases and upon such con-
ditions as it may see fit to prescribe. In the United States this power is
vested in the national government, to which the Constitution has com-
mitted the entire control of international relations, in peace as well as in
war. It belongs to the political department of the government .... 0
The majority held that there was no limitation on the government's power to
expel or exclude aliens who had not progressed towards citizenship or be-
come naturalized. 5 1 Because the Court held that Congress had an absolute
right to expel aliens, Congress also had the right to regulate their presence
by passing the Registration Act.52 Justice Story recognized that, while
within the territory of the United States, aliens with the intention of perma-
nent residence are entitled to the protection of the nation's laws.5 3 The
Court made a distinction, however, at the point at which Congress' power,
40. See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 599-600.
41. Id. at 609.
42. Id. at 603-04.
43. Id. at 606.
44. Id. at 607.
45. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1983).
46. Act of May 5, 1892, ch. 60, 25 Stat. 25 (repealed 1943).
47. Id.
48. Id.; Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 727.
49. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 713.
50. Id. at 705.
51. Id. at 707.
52. Id. at 714.
53. Id. at 724.
1992]
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in the interest of the nation's welfare, is employed to expel them.54 Aliens
could not call upon the laws to protect them from Congress' authority to
expel.55 Under the majority opinion in Fong Yue Ting, an alien enjoys the
protection of the laws of the United States only when remaining within the
United States with the permission of the sovereign. 56
In a strong dissent, Justice Brewer asserted that the plaintiffs were lawful
permanent residents of the United States and so were entitled to the protec-
tions of the Constitution. 57 Thus, the Registration Act violated their consti-
tutional rights to liberty and due process. 58 Justice Brewer argued that
resident aliens, "those who have become domiciled in a country, are entitled
to a more distinct and larger measure of protection than those who are sim-
ply passing through." 59 Justice Brewer rejected the majority's assertion that
the sovereignty of the nation granted Congress the absolute authority to ex-
pel aliens unencumbered by the Constitution and pointed to the Tenth
Amendment's retention of powers in the states or the people. 6° The concept
of a sovereign and unlimited power is one which Justice Brewer found to be
dangerously indefinite. 6' Although Justice Brewer admitted the power of
the nation to exclude, he found no power to banish resident aliens.62 He also
interpreted the Bill of Rights as applying to all persons within the United
States, noting that the word citizen is not used within them.63
Justice Field wrote a separate dissent focusing upon the entry of the Chi-
nese laborers with the consent of the United States under treaties with
China.64 Justice Field made a distinction between those aliens who are for-
eigners and those who have been allowed to enter and establish domicile.65
He argued that deportation of resident aliens had only been permitted for
commission of crime or as an act of war.66 Justice Field compared the Alien
Registration Act to the Aliens Act of 1798,67 which allowed the President
to expel aliens believed to be dangerous. The Aliens Act had been criticized
as bestowing an undelegated power upon the President and violating the
balance of the Constitution.6" Justice Field leveled the same criticisms at the
Alien Registration Act because it bestowed a power not expressly delegated
to Congress. 69 Additionally, Justice Brewer asserted that:




57. Id. at 733 (Brewer, J., dissenting).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 734.
60. Id. at 737.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 739.
64. Id. at 746 (Field, J., dissenting).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.; see Aliens Act of 1798, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 (expired 1800).
68. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 746-48 (Field, J., dissenting); Tilner, supra note 3, at 8-13.
69. Id. at 750.
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citizens are parties to it, that, whilst they actually conform to it, they
have no right to its protection. Aliens are not more parties to the laws
than they are parties to the Constitution; yet it will not be disputed that,
as they owe, on one hand, a temporary obedience, they are entitled, in
return, to their protection and advantage.70
Justices Brewer and Field thus saw a distinction between resident aliens and
nonresident aliens with regard to Constitutional protections that the major-
ity did not accept.
In Wong Wing,71 an alien challenged Section Four of the Registration Act
as an infliction of an infamous punishment without affording the Fifth
Amendment right of indictment and Sixth Amendment right to jury trial for
infamous crimes. Section Four provided that "any such Chinese person, or
person of Chinese descent, convicted and adjudged to be not lawfully enti-
tled to be or remain in the United States, shall be imprisoned at hard labor
for a period not exceeding one year, and thereafter removed from the United
States ... ."72 Although holding that a trial be held in order to subject an
unlawful alien to punishment, Justice Shiras' majority opinion stated that
[n]o limits can be put by the courts upon the power of Congress to
protect, by summary methods, the country from the advent of aliens
whose races or habits render them undesirable as citizens, or to expel
such if they have already found their way into our land and unlawfully
remain therein. 73
Wong Wing signaled a slightly expanded role for the Courts in immigration
policy and enforcement. This power of review, however, was limited to en-
suring the provision of basic procedural due process when a punishment is
imposed for unlawful entry or presence within the United States.74 Con-
gress' unbounded and exclusive power to expel resident aliens was thus
firmly established.
D. Limitations on Resident Aliens' First Amendment Rights
in the 20th Century
Aliens, both resident and nonresident, have been excluded or deported
from the United States on the basis of political belief and affiliation at least
since 1903 when the first legislation excluding anarchists was passed.75 The
McCarren-Walter Act 76 codified deportation and exclusion for membership
in, affiliation with, or the advocacy of the goals of subversive organizations. 77
70. Id. at 749.
71. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 233-34 (1896).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 237.
74. Id. at 237-38.
75. Tilner, supra note 3, at 30. The Act of March 3, 1903, provided for the exclusion of
alien anarchists and aliens opposed to organized government. Ch.- 1012, 23 Stat. 1213 (1903);
see Tilner, supra note 3, at 36-32 (describing the origins and passage of the Act).
76. Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified at 8 U.S.C. 1101
1524 (1988)) (prior to amendment by Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat.
4978).
77. 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a)(6) (1988) (prior to 1990 amendment). Deportable aliens include:
1992]
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It also provided for the exclusion of those who advocated communism or
the overthrow of the United States government through force and violence. 78
An early First Amendment case involving the revocation of the citizen-
ship of a naturalized resident alien expressed the conflict between Congress'
power to establish conditions for the grant and revocation of naturalization
and First Amendment protection of free thought and speech.79 The United
States Government sought Schneiderman's denaturalization because he had
not revealed his membership in the Communist Party at the time of his natu-
ralization. The naturalization laws in 1927, the time of Schneiderman's nat-
uralization, did not expressly disqualify Communist Party members,
although they generally excluded individuals and members of organizations
that did not believe in organized government.8 0 The Government argued
that because Schneiderman had been a member of the Communist party at
the time of his naturalization he did not satisfy the requirement that he up-
any alien who is or at any time has been, after entry, a member of any of the
following classes of aliens:
(a) aliens who are anarchists;
(b) aliens who advocate or teach, or who are members of or affiliated with any
organization that advocates or teaches, opposition to all organized government;
(c) Aliens who are members of or affiliated with (i) the Communist party of the
United States; (ii) any other totalitarian party of the United States; (iii) the
Communist Political Association; (iv) the Communist or any other totalitarian
party of any State of the United States, of any foreign state, or of any political or
geographical subdivision of any Foreign State; ....
(d) Aliens not within any of the other provisions of this paragraph who advo-
cate the economic, international, and governmental doctrines of world commu-
nism or the establishment in the United States of a totalitarian dictatorship, or
who are members of or affiliated with any organization that advocates the eco-
nomic, international and governmental doctrines of world communism . . .
either through its own utterances or through any written or printed publications
issued or published by or with the permission or consent of or under the author-
ity of such organization or paid for by the funds of, or funds furnished by, such
organization;
(f) Aliens who advocate or teach or who are members of or affiliated with any
organization that advocates or teaches
(i) the overthrow by force, violence, or other unconstitutional means of the
Government of the United States or of all other forms of law; or (ii) the duty,
necessity, or propriety, of the unlawful assaulting or killing of any officer or
officers (either of specific individuals or of officers generally) of the Government
of the United States or of any other organized government, because of his or
their official character; or (iii) the unlawful damage, injury, or destruction of
property; or (iv) sabotage.
Id.
78. Id.
79. See Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 131-32 (1943).
The Constitution authorizes Congress "to establish an uniform Rule of Natural-
ization" (Art. I, 8, cl. 4), and we may assume that naturalization is a privilege,
to be given or withheld on such conditions as Congress sees fit .... But because
of our firmly rooted tradition of freedom of belief, we certainly will not presume
in construing the naturalization and denaturalization acts that Congress meant
to circumscribe liberty of political thought by general phrases in those statutes.
Id. (citations omitted).
80. See Act of June 29, 1906, ch. 3592, § 4, 34 Stat. 596, 598 (current version at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1427 (a)(1988)).
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hold the Constitution and the order of the United States.8 ' The government
argued that the Communist Party to which he belonged advocated radical
changes in government through force and violence.
Justice Murphy, writing for the Supreme Court, rejected the claim that
Schneiderman was not attached to the Constitution simply because of his
Communist Party membership by noting that a distinction must be made
between the views of the party and the views of Schneiderman as an individ-
ual.8 2 The goals and beliefs of the party to which Schneiderman belonged
could not be imputed to him without proof of Schneiderman's individual
belief in these principles.83 Membership alone was insufficient.8 4
The Court emphasized the central position that the free exchange of a
diversity of beliefs occupies in the Constitution. 5 This exchange includes
proposals for the reform of the United States government and even for the
alteration of the Constitution.8 6 Attachment to the Constitution did not,
therefore, require uncritical allegiance. 8 7 Schneiderman did not distinguish
between citizens and resident aliens in the context of First Amendment pro-
tections except to favor a construction of the statute that allowed "novi-
tiates" as well as citizens full freedoms of belief.8 8 Schneiderman implied
that all persons within the territory of the United states were entitled to the
protection of the First Amendment. This opinion has been largly ignored in
later jurisprudence although it was the basis for dicta in full protection of
non-citizens speech activities.
Bridges v. Wixon 89 has been cited by the Supreme Court as establishing
the extension of First Amendment protections to resident aliens.9° The deci-
81. The naturalization statute required that an applicant be "attached to the principles of
the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the
same." Schneiderman, 320 U.S. at 133 (quoting Act of June 29, 1906, ch. 3592, § 4, 34 Stat.
596, 598 (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (1988 & 1990 Supp.))).
82. Id. at 136.
83. Id. at 136, 146. The Court stated that
[u]nder our traditions beliefs are personal and not a matter of mere association,
and ... men in adhering to a political party or other organization notoriously do
not subscribe unqualifiedly to all of its platforms or asserted principles ....
Th[e] principles and views [of the Communist Party] are not generally ac-
cepted-in fact they are distasteful to most of us-and they call for considerable
change in our present form of government and society. But we do not think the
government has carried its burden of proving by evidence which does not leave
the issue in doubt that petitioner was not in fact attached to the principles of the
Constitution and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the United
States when he was naturalized in 1927.
Id. at 136.
84. Id. at 136, 146.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 137. "The constitutional fathers, fresh from a revolution, did not forge a polit-
ical strait-jacket for generations to come. Instead they wrote Article V and the First Amend-
ment, guaranteeing freedom of thought, soon followed." Id.
87. Id. at 157-58.
88. Id. at 158.
89. 326 U.S. 135 (1945).
90. United States v. Verdugo-Urguidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990); Kwong Hai Chew v.
Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 n.5 (1953) (quoting Bridges, 326 U.S. at 161 (Murphy, J., concur-
ring)). Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306, 309 n.5 (1970) (same quotation).
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sion in Bridges, however, does not directly support this conclusion. Rather,
the Bridges majority, like the Schneiderman court, avoided the direct consti-
tutional question by basing its decision on a narrow reading of the deporta-
tion statute. 9'
Bridges legally entered the United States in 1920 from Australia.92 In
1938, the United States Government brought deportation proceedings
against him on the grounds of Communist Party membership and affiliation.
Under the deportation statute in force at the time, 93 past membership or
affiliation was not a sufficient ground for deportation 94 and there was a lack
of evidence of Bridges' membership at the time of deportation or entry, so
the proceeding failed.95 Congress then amended the deportation statute96 to
make deportable any alien who had been a member of or affiliated with an
organization such as the Communist Party "at the time of entering the
United States, or ... at any time thereafter."' 97 Following this amendment,
the INS again brought deportation proceedings against Bridges. This time,
evidence of Bridges' affiliation with the Communist Party and the Marine
Workers Industrial Union (considered to be affiliated with the Communist
Party) since arriving in the United States, was found to be sufficient for de-
portation.98 Bridges challenged his deportation on First Amendment
grounds, but the majority opinion in Bridges did not reach these claims.99
Instead, the Court required that, in order to deport Bridges for affiliation
with the Communist Party, the INS prove that Bridges' activities were re-
lated to furthering the purposes of the Communist Party and not merely that
he cooperated with the Party to achieve lawful goals.1° ° Because the INS
had not shown this, the Court held that Bridges could not be deported under
the statute. ' 0 '
Justice Douglas' majority opinion in Bridges v. Wixon grounded resident
91. Bridges, 326 U.S. at 156-57.
92. Daniel J. Piliero, III, The Attempts to Deport Harry Bridges, 5 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 237
(1991).
93. Acts of October 16, 1918, ch. 186, § 1, 40 Stat. 1012; Act of June 5, 1920, ch.251, 41
Stat. 1008; Act of June 28, 1940, ch. 439, § 23. 54 Stat. 673; Act of Sept. 23, 1950, ch. 1024
§ 22, 64 Stat. 1006 (formerly codified at 8 U.S.C. § 137), repealed by Act of June 27, 1952, ch.
477, § 403(a), (13), (16), (48), 66 Stat. 279, 280 (cited in Piliero, supra note 92, at 241 n. 40).
94. Bridges, 326 U.S. at 137 (citing Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U.S. 22 (1939)).
95. Id.
96. Act of June 28, 1940, ch. 439, § 23, 54 Stat. 670, 673 (repealed 1952).
97. Id.
98. Bridges, 326 U.S. at 139. The inspector assigned to conduct hearings and make a
recommendation found sufficient evidence. Id. The Board of Immigration Appeals, however,
did not find sufficient evidence that Bridges had been affiliated with either organization after
his entry into the United States. Id. at 139-40. The Attorney General reviewed the Board's
decision and recommended deportation. Id. at 140. Bridges then voluntarily entered the cus-
tody of immigration officials and petitioned for habeas corpus to the District Court for the
Northern District of California. Id. The District Court denied the petition. Id. (citing Ex
parte Bridges, 49 F. Supp. 292, 307 (N.D. Cal. 1943)). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed. Id. (citing Bridges v. Wixon, 144 F.2d 927, 944 (9th Cir. 1944)).
99. Bridges, 326 U.S. at 156-57.
100. Id. at 142-43.
101. Id. at 145.
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aliens' First Amendment rights in a narrow reading of the legislative intent
of Congress:
It is clear that Congress desired to have the country rid of those aliens
who embraced the political faith of force and violence. But we cannot
believe that Congress intended to cast so wide a net as to reach those
whose ideas and program, though coinciding with the legitimate aims of
such groups, nevertheless fell far short of overthrowing the government
by force and violence.' 0 2
Implied in this reading is a recognition of Congress' power to provide for the
deportation of resident aliens for activities normally protected by the First
Amendment. Continuing congressional efforts to deport Harry Bridges be-
lied the constitutional motives attributed to Congress by Justice Douglas. 103
The House of Representatives pursued efforts to deport Bridges to the extent
that a special bill directing the Attorney General to deport Bridges
"notwithstanding any other provision of law"104 was introduced and passed
by the House but defeated by the Senate.105
In a glancing reference to the application of First Amendment protections
to permanent resident aliens, the Court cited an earlier case involving
Bridges for the proposition that "[fjreedom of speech and of press is ac-
corded aliens residing in this country."'1 6 The case to which Justice Doug-
las cited involved a challenge to contempt proceedings instituted against
Bridges' for editorials criticizing ongoing judicial proceedings written in his
position as union leader.107 Although the Court found that these writings
were protected by the First Amendment, the opinion had not addressed in
any way Bridges' status as a resident alien or the application of First
Amendment protections to resident aliens.' 0 8 Bridges' freedoms of speech
and of the press as a resident alien were protected without discussion or
challenge. 109
In contrast to the majority opinion, Justice Murphy's concurrence
strongly and unequivocally found Bridges' First Amendment protections to
lie in the Constitution itself, rather than in precedent or Congressional in-
tent)10 Although Justice Murphy acknowledged that Congress' power to
102. Id. at 147-48.
103. Id. at 158-59. (Murphy, J., concurring).
104. Id. at 158.
105. See id. After the Attorney General rejected this special bill, Congress enacted § 23 of
the Alien Registration Act of 1940, ch. 439, 54 Stat. 673 (repealed 1952), which made mem-
bership in a proscribed organization unnecessary at the time a warrant for deportation is is-
sued. Bridges, at 326 U.S. at 158. Justice Murphy quoted the author of the amendment as
follows: "It is my joy to announce that this bill will do, in a perfectly legal and constitutional
manner, what the bill specifically aimed at the deportation of Harry Bridges seeks to accom-
plish. This bill changes the law so that the Department of Justice should now have little
trouble in deporting Harry Bridges and all others of similar ilk." Id. at 158-59 (citing 86
Cong. Rec. 9031 (1940)).
106. Id. at 148 (citing Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941)).
107. For an account of Bridges' union activities see Piliero, supra note 92, at 237-40.
108. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270 (1941).
109. Id.
110. Bridges, 326 U.S. at 157 (Murphy, J., concurring). Justice Murphy stated: "[s]eldom
if ever in the history of this nation has there been such a concentrated and relentless crusade to
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exclude aliens is based in the "inherent sovereignty of the United States,""'I
he made a distinction between aliens seeking admission for the first time and
aliens who have lawfully entered and reside within the United States. 1 2 For
Justice Murphy, those aliens who lawfully reside within the United States
"become invested with the rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all peo-
ple within our borders. ' 1 3 Justice Murphy noted that the First, Fifth, and
Fourteenth Amendments do not distinguish between citizens and resident
aliens, 14 and concluded that Congress' plenary power to deport resident
aliens was limited by the protections contained in these Amendments." 15
Justice Murphy's literal use of the terms used within the Constitution is the
second reading of this kind within the jurisprudence of resident aliens enti-
tlement to First Amendment protections. As in Justices Brewer and Field's
dissents, this textual reading is employed to argue for the extension of First
Amendment rights. This methodology will resurface in later Supreme Court
opinions. "16
The majority opinion in Bridges v. Wixon, particularly when compared to
Justice Murphy's concurring opinion, clearly does not provide a firm
grounding of resident aliens' First Amendment protections in the Constitu-
tion itself. Instead, the Court relied upon a skewed reading of Congressional
intent that ignored the motives for the enactment of the amendments under
which Bridges' deportation proceedings were instituted."17
Deportation was initially used as a way of enforcing exclusionary restric-
tions. 118 In the late Nineteenth Century new laws widened the reach of the
deportation statutes beyond unlawful Chinese laborers to reach lawful resi-
dents of various classes including prostitutes, anarchists, members of subver-
sive organizations, and advocates of the forceful and violent overthrow of
the United States government. 119 Deportation of resident aliens, those law-
fully within the United States, was subject to time restrictions of commonly
3-5 years after entry.120 These time limits, as well as restrictions as to when
a prohibited act or status had occurred, were abolished in the Alien Regis-
tration Act of 1940.121
deport an individual because he dared to exercise the freedom that belongs to him as a human
being and that is guaranteed to him by the Constitution." Id.




115. Bridges, 326 U.S. at 161-62.
116. See supra notes 57-70 and accompanying text.
117. But see Heather R. Henthorne, Resident Aliens and the First Amendment: The Need
for Judicial Recognition of Full Free Speech and Association Rights, 39 CATH. U.L. REV. 595,
603-07 (1990) (discussing Bridges v. Wixon as a step in a continuum of recognition of First
Amendment rights).
118. Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 588 n.15.
119. Id. at 588, 589 n.15.
120. Id.
121. Ch. 439, § 23(b), 54 Stat. 670, 673 (repealed 1952) see Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 588
n.15. The Alien Registration Act was passed in response to the Supreme Court's decision in
Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U.S. 22 (1939), which held that to be deported aliens must have been a
member of a proscribed organization at the time deportation proceedings were instituted
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Harisiades v. Shaughnessy,122 decided in 1952, presented a challenge to
the Alien Registration Act,1 23 which allowed the deportation of resident
aliens for Communist Party membership occurring after an alien was law-
fully admitted to the United States. 124 Three resident aliens challenged the
statute claiming that it violated the Fifth Amendment by depriving them of
liberty without due process of law and violated their First Amendment free-
doms of free speech and assembly. The aliens also attacked the statute as an
impermissible ex post facto law. Each of the deportees had lived in the
United States as legal permanent residents for more than thirty years.
Justice Jackson's opinion for the majority drew a rigid distinction between
citizens and resident aliens, asserting that the two did not have equal stand-
ing before the law.125 Aliens were entitled to the protections of "a large
measure" of equal economic opportunity, personal liberty, the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments, and the Just Compensation Clause. 126 Aliens, however,
could not be elected to various public offices, could not vote, could be sub-
jected to travel restrictions which would not apply to citizens, and had the
burden of proving their right to remain within the United States if arrested
for illegal entry.' 27 If a resident alien's country was at war with the United
States, the resident alien was subject to expulsion, internment, and seizure or
confiscation of property.' 28 The power to deport resident aliens, however,
was not dependent upon a state of war; it could be exercised in the case of
both foreign and domestic dangers.' 29 Deportation could thus be used to
promote both foreign affairs and national security.' 30 The use of deportation
to expel longtime resident aliens was justified by the "precarious tenure"'13'
under which the resident alien resided within the United States. 32 The
against them. Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 588 n. 15. (citing Kessler, 307 U.S. at 30). The Commu-
nist Party reacted by discontinuing all alien memberships in 1939 to avoid the deportation of
its members under the statute. Id. at 583. The Alien Registration Act thus had the practical
effect of causing membership in a subversive organization at any time in an alien's past to
constitute a ground for deportation. See id.; Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 138, n.l (1945).
See Tilner, supra note 3, at 53-54 for a discussion of the passage of the Act.
122. 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
123. See supra notes 3, 105.
124. See Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 581.
125. Id. at 586. "Under our law, the alien in several respects stands on an equal footing
with citizens, but in others has never been conceded legal parity with the citizen." Id. (foot-
notes omitted).
126. Id. at 586 n.9.
127. Id. at 586 n.10.
128. Id. at 587.
129. Id. The Court stated:"it does not require war to bring the power of deportation into
existence or to authorize its exercise. Congressional apprehension of foreign or internal dan-
gers short of war may lead to its use." Id.
130. Id. at 588-89.
131. Id. at 587.
132. Id.
So long as one thus perpetuates a dual status as an American inhabitant but
foreign citizen, he may derive advantages from two sources of law-American
and international. He may claim protection against our Government unavaila-
ble to the citizen. As an alien he retains a claim upon the state of his citizenship
to diplomatic intervention on his behalf, a patronage often of considerable value.
The state of origin of each of these aliens could presently enter diplomatic re-
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Court found resident aliens' presence within the United States to be "a mat-
ter of permission and tolerance"' 133 rather than a vested right. 134 Justice
Jackson rooted the right to expel long-time resident aliens through deporta-
tion in the power of the nation-state under international law. 135 Justice
Jackson characterized deportation as "a weapon of defense and reprisal"' 136
resulting from the nation-state's interactions with other nation-states. 37
The Court viewed the Alien Registration Act as a proper exercise of the
power of the state and, because it was "vitally and intricately interwoven"1 38
with matters of the preservation of the government, foreign relations, and
war, outside of the purview of the judiciary.13 9 The Court then declined to
consider whether a Communist Party conspiracy existed that justified the
deportation statute, as this was a purely political question involving national
security. 140
The Court addressed the deportees' First Amendment challenge in a
somewhat cryptic rejection based upon a distinction between advocating
change through electoral processes and advocating change by force or vio-
lence. 1 41 The First Amendment provided protection for the advocacy of
Communism through voting but not through "methodical but prudent in-
citement to violence."' 42 This was a somewhat ironic statement after Justice
Jackson's listing of rights that resident aliens did not have, including the
right to vote. Because a resident alien remained unable to vote, however, by
having chosen not to seek naturalization,1 43 the denial of any First Amend-
ment protection was logical.'4 Justice Jackson distinguished between "ad-
monstrance against these deportations if they were inconsistent with interna-
tional law, the prevailing custom among nations or their own practices.
Id. at 585.
133. Id. at 586-87.
134. Id. at 586.
135. Id. at 587-88.
136. Id. at 587.
137. Id. at 587-88. "[I]n strict law, a State can expel even domiciled aliens without so
much as giving the reasons, the refusal of the expelling State to supply the reasons for expul-
sion to the home state of the expelled alien does not constitute an illegal, but only a very
unfriendly act.'" Id. at 588 n. 14 (citations omitted) (quoting LASSA OPPENHEIM, 1 INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 499 (3rd ed. 1920)).
138. Id. at 588.
139. Id. at 588-90.
140. Id. at 590.
141. Id. at 592.
142. Id. But see Gitlow v. People of New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes &
Brandeis, JJ., dissenting) ("Every idea is an incitement.").
143. Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 586 n.10.
144. See id. at 592.
Our Constitution sought to leave no excuse for violent attack on the status quo
by providing a legal alternative-attack by ballot. To arm all men for orderly
change, the Constitution put in their hands a right to influence the electorate by
press, speech and assembly. This means freedom to advocate or promote Com-
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vocacy of political methods'' 45 and "incitement to violence' 146 in order to
employ the clear and present danger test articulated in Dennis v. United
States. 147
The Harisiades majority found that the deportees' membership in the
Communist Party satisfied this test. 148 The Court concluded that the statute
did not unlawfully infringe upon the exercise of First Amendment rights.' 49
Justice Jackson's limitation of protected speech to advocacy of change
through electoral processes thus resulted in extremely limited First Amend-
ment protections for resident aliens. 15
Justice Jackson's brief and conclusory discussion of the First Amendment
challenge in Harisiades must be read against Dennis, decided one year ear-
lier, in order to gain its full significance. Dennis presented a First and Fifth
Amendment challenge to the Smith Act,' 5 ' which made it illegal" 'to organ-
ize or help to organize any society, group, or assembly of persons who teach,
advocate, or encourage the overthrow or destruction of any government in
the United States by force or violence.' "152 The defendants in Dennis,
United States citizens, were charged with a conspiracy to violate the Act. A
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 592 (citing Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 513 (1951).
True, it often is difficult to determine whether ambiguous speech is advocacy of
political methods or subtly shades into a methodical but prudent incitement to
violence. Communist governments avoid the inquiry by suppressing everything
distasteful. Some would have us avoid the difficulty by going to the opposite
extreme of permitting incitement to violent overthrow at least unless it seems
certain to succeed immediately. We apprehend that the Constitution enjoins
upon us the duty, however difficult, of distinguishing between the two.... [T]he
test applicable to the Communist Party has been stated too recently to make
further discussion at this time profitable. [citing Dennis v. United States, 341
U.S. 494 (1951)]. We think the First Amendment does not prevent the deporta-
tion of these aliens.
Id. The court relied on Dennis' formulation of the "clear and present danger" test as one from
which "a substantive public evil will result .. " Dennis, 341 U.S. at 508 (quoting American
Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 412 (1950)). This test requires that there be a
clear and present danger that the activities under the circumstances will result in a substantive
evil that Congress has the authority to prevent. Id.
148. See Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 591-92. The majority's opinion does not explicitly state its
reasoning. Instead, after accepting the lower court's finding that the Communist Party advo-
cated the overthrow of the government during the defendants' membership, the Court con-
flated the actions of individuals associated with the Communist Party with the activities of the
organization as a whole. Id. at 581-84. But cf Bridges, 326 U.S. at 143-44 (affiliation requires
proof of act or acts showing furtherance of the organization's purposes; cooperation in lawful
goals is insufficient).
149. Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 592.
150. See id. The Court's decision did not address the associational rights of the deportees.
The court took the plaintiffs' membership in a group advocating the violent overthrow of the
government as a finding of the lower court and so did not reach the question of whether the
Act require individual advocacy of the overthrow of government through force and violence.
Id. at 591-92. See Bridges, 326 U.S. at 143-44 for a discussion of the statutory requirements of
membership and affiliation.
151. Ch. 439, § 2 54 Stat. 670, 671 (1940) (current version codified at 18 U.S.C. 2385
(1988) (prior to amendment by 62 Stat. 808 (1948)).
152. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 517 (construing Smith Act, ch. 439, § 2(a)(3), 54 Stat. 670, 671
(1940) (prior to amendment by 62 Stat. 808, (1948)) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the judg-
ment of the plurality).
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plurality of the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Act against the
defendants' First and Fifth Amendment challenges.' 5 3
The Dennis defendants argued that the Smith Act violated their First
Amendment rights because their activities had not presented a substantial
enough danger to warrant application of the statute under the clear and
present danger standard. They claimed that the statute's application to their
activities could only be justified if "an immediate danger of obvious magni-
tude to the very existence of our present scheme of society"' 154 had been
created by those activities. The Court rejected this argument on the basis
that the First Amendment does not protect activities that cause a clear and
present danger that the harm sought to be prevented will occur.' 55 The
clear and present danger standard as applied in the criminal context in Den-
nis differs greatly when applied in the deportation context. Because deporta-
tion is not considered to be a criminal proceeding, the alien does not have
the constitutional protections applicable to criminal proceedings. 156 Addi-
tionally, the Court's plurality opinion in Dennis stressed the requirement of
proof of an individual's intent to overthrow the government through force
and violence. 157 Proof of intent was missing from the Harisiades decision: it
was implied from active membership in an organization which advocated the
overthrow of government through force and violence. 158
Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in Harisiades echoed the majority asser-
tion that resident aliens remained in their host country at the discretion of
that country and did not gain any constitutionally protectible interest in re-
maining.1 59 This was due to:
a world order based on politically sovereign States .... [in which] a
national State implies a special relationship of one body of people, i.e.,
citizens of that State, whereby the citizens of each State are aliens in
relation to every other State. Ever since national States have come into
being, the right of people to enjoy the hospitality of a State in which
they are not citizens has been a matter of political determination by
each State.'60
153. Id. 341 U.S. at 516-17.
154. Id. at 518-19.
155. Id. at 534. "The First Amendment 'cannot have been, and obviously was not, in-
tended to give immunity for every possible use of language!" Id. (quoting Robertson v. Bald-
win, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897)).
The question in every case is whether the words are used in such circumstances
and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will
bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a
question of proximity and degree.
Id. (quoting Frohwerk v. United States, 294 U.S. 204, 206 (1919); Schenck v. United States,
249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
156. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 749 (1893).
157. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 499-500. "The existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than
the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence." Id. at 499. (em-
phasis removed). The Court explained that an explicit Congressional indication that the crime
should not require intent to be proved as an element would be required in the statute. Id.
158. Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 581-84.
159. Id. at 596 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
160. Id.
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For Justice Frankfurter, as well as the majority in Harisiades, immigration
law was purely a political matter under the power of the political branch and
therefore outside of the concern of the judiciary. 161 All immigration policy
was exclusively within the authority of Congress, including the decision to
terminate aliens' long-term residence within the United States. 162 Although
Justice Frankfurter did see a role for the judiciary in the enforcement of the
rules which Congress imposed upon immigration officials and the mainte-
nance of procedural due process, 163 policy decisions defining aliens who
were permitted to establish or continue residence in the United States were
immune from review.164
In a strong dissent from the Harisiades majority, Justice Douglas, joined
by Justice Black, rejected the majority's formulation of exclusive and unlim-
ited Congressional power over immigration.1 6 5 They referred to past
Supreme Court decisions which held that resident aliens enjoyed constitu-
tional protections1 66 and asserted that the right to liberty necessarily in-
cluded the right to be free from arbitrary expulsion.167 The dissent did not
address the defendants' First Amendment argument. Instead, Justice Doug-
las based his rejection of absolute Congressional power over immigration on
the express constitutional right to life and liberty which preempted Con-
gress' implied power of deportation. 68 Because Congress' power to deport
resident aliens was implied from the grant of power to "establish an uniform
Rule of Naturalization," 1 69 the express guarantees contained within the
Fifth Amendment, encompassing all persons, should have prevailed. 170
The dissent did, however, locate an exception to these express guarantees
where Congress was acting to preserve the safety and security of the na-
tion. 17 1 If an alien's actions were shown to be dangerous to the security and
safety of the nation, the dissent would allow the alien's deportation regard-
161. Id. at 596-97.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 597. Justice Frankfurter cited Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454, 464
(1920), for judicial review of the administration of immigration laws in compliance with Con-
gressional mandates, and Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284-85 (1922), for due process's
demand that certain procedures be observed. Id.
164. Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 597 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). "[W]hether immigration
laws have been crude and cruel, whether they may have reflected xenophobia in general or
anti-Semitism or anti-Catholicism, the responsibility belongs to Congress." Id.
165. Id. at 599-600 (Douglas & Black, J.J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 598-99. The dissent cited Toras Takashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 334 U.S.
410, 420-21 (1948) (right of non-citizen to fish in state waters); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S.
252, 270 (1941) (protections of First Amendment); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 42 (1915)
(right of non-citizen to employment); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237 (1896)
(entitlement to protections of Fifth and Sixth Amendments); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States,
142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892) (entitlement to writ of habeas corpus); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356, 369 (1886) (equal economic opportunity under state law). For a discussion of aliens'
protections under the Bill of Rights, see Immigration Policy and the Rights ofAliens, 96 HARV.
L. REV. 1286, 1311-33 (1982).
167. Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 600 (Douglas & Black, J.J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 599.
169. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4).
170. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; U.S. CONST. amend. V).
171. Id. at 599-601.
1992]
SMU LAW REVIEW
less of the length of residence.' 72 Ultimately, the dissent's disagreement
with the majority in Harisiades lay not in the nature of the standard to be
employed but merely in the degree and methods of proof of danger neces-
sary. 173 Both accepted that the clear and present danger standard could
allow the deportation of long-term resident aliens on the basis of expressive
activities implicating the First Amendment. 174
II. FOREIGN POLICY AND TERRORISM: NEW LIMITATIONS ON
RESIDENT ALIENS' FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS
A. First Amendment Protections Extended and then Contracted for
Resident Aliens
Section 901 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1987175 was
proposed as a temporary revision of the McCarren-Walter Act 176 in order to
rid the immigration laws of provisions excluding immigrants for their polit-
ical beliefs.177 Aliens would continue to be deported and denied naturaliza-
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. See id. at 591-92, 599-601 (Douglas & Black, J.J., dissenting).
175. Pub. L. No. 100-204, § 901, 101 Stat. 1331, 1399-1400 (1987) (amended 1988) (re-
pealed 1990).
176. Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified at 8 U.S.C.
1101-1524 (1988) (prior to amendment by Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104
Stat. 4978).
177. Cole, supra note 2, at 22. Section 901 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act
provided:
PROHIBITION ON EXCLUSION OR DEPORTATION OF ALIENS ON
CERTAIN GROUNDS
(a) IN GENERAL-Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no non-im-
migrant alien may be denied a visa or excluded from admission into the United
States, or subject to deportation because of any past, current or expected beliefs,
statements or associations which, if engaged in by a United States citizen in the
United States, would be protected under the Constitution of the United States.
(b) CONSTRUCTION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE ALIENS.-
Nothing in this shall be construed as affecting the existing authority of the exec-
utive branch to deport, to deny issuance of a visa to, to deny adjustment of
status of, or to deny admission to the United States of, any alien-
(1) for reasons of foreign policy or national security, except that such deporta-
tion may not be based on past current, or expected beliefs, statements, or as-
sociations which, if engaged in by a United States citizen in the United States,
would be protected under the Constitution of the United States, unless such
alien is seeking issuance of a visa, adjustment of status, or admission to the
United states as an immigrant;
(2) who a consular official or the Attorney General knows or has reasonable
ground to believe has engaged, in an individual capacity or as a member of an
organization, in terrorist activity or is likely to engage after entry in a terrorist
activity; or
(3) who seeks to enter in an official capacity as a representative of a purported
labor organization in a country where such organizations are in fact instruments
of a totalitarian state.
In addition, nothing in subsection (a) shall be construed as applying to an
alien who is described in section 212(a)(33) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act (relating to those who assisted in the Nazi persecutions), to an alien de-
scribed in the last sentence of section 101(a)(42) of such Act (relating to those
assisting in other persecutions) who is seeking the benefits of section 207, 208,
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tion due to their political beliefs and activities, however, because aliens who
had engaged in terrorist activity, who were members of the Palestine Libera-
tion Organization, or whose entry was adverse to foreign policy, were not
included in the protection of the section. 1 8 Section 901 extended initially to
all aliens, however, in 1988 it was amended to apply only to non-immigrant
aliens. 179 As a result, the amended Section 901 offered no constitutional
protection to resident aliens, who were classified as immigrant aliens rather
than as non-immigrant aliens.' 80
In RaFeedie v. Immigration & Naturalization Service,' 8' the INS at-
tempted to summarily exclude a resident alien returning to the United States
after a short trip abroad because of suspected terrorist contact by the resi-
dent alien while absent from the United States. The court employed the
distinction between resident and nonresident aliens with regard to the extent
of constitutional protections afforded to reject the use of a summary proce-
dure in this case.' 8 2 The D.C. Circuit Court explained that, when a resident
alien gains admission to the United States and begins to develop significant
personal and legal ties, the resident alien develops a liberty interest in re-
maining in the United States which is "substantial enough to command the
protection of due process before he may be excluded or deported .... ,,183
243(h)(1), or 245A of such Act (relating to admission as a refugee, asylum, with-
holding of deportation, and legalization), or to an alien who is described in sec-
tion 21(c) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (members of
the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)). In paragraph (2), the term "ter-
rorist activity" means the organizing, abetting or participating in a wanton or
indiscriminate act of violence with extreme indifference to the risk of causing
death or serious bodily harm to individuals not taking part in armed hostilities.
Pub. L. 100-204, § 901, 101 Stat. 1331, 1399-1400 (1987) (amended 1988) (repealed 1990).
178. Id. § 901(b)(3).
179. Pub. L. No. 100-204 § 901, 101 Stat. 1331, 1399-1440 (1987) (amended 1988) (re-
pealed 1990). The Immigration and Nationality Act classifies aliens in three general catego-
ries: illegal aliens, lawfully admitted non-immigrant aliens and lawfully admitted immigrant
aliens. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79 n.13 (1976) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101) (1970)). Non-
immigrants are defined to include:
officials and employees of foreign governments and certain international organi-
zations; aliens visiting temporarily for business or pleasure; aliens in transit
through this country; alien crewmen serving on a vessel or aircraft; aliens enter-
ing pursuant to a treaty of commerce and navigation to carry on trade or an
enterprise in which they have invested; aliens entering to study in this country;
certain aliens coming temporarily to perform services or labor to serve as train-
ees; alien representatives of the foreign press and other information media; cer-
tain aliens coming temporarily to participate in a program in their field of study
or specialization; aliens engaged to be married to citizens; and certain alien em-
ployees entering temporarily to continue to render services to the same
employers.
Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(15)(1970)). Immigrant aliens are defined as those aliens who do
not fall within one of the classes of non-immigrants. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Comm. v. Meese, 714 F. Supp. 1060, 1064 n.4 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (citing 8 U.S.C.
1101(a)(15)(Supp. 1988).
180. See Cole, supra note 2, at 22.
181. 880 F.2d 506 (1989).
182. Id. Cf United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 273 (1990) (constitutional
rights of an illegal alien voluntarily in the U.S. differ from those of an alien not in the country
voluntarily).
183. Rafeedie, 880 F.2d at 522. The court noted that permanent resident aliens are re-
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These substantive due process protections can be lost under Congressional
naturalization statutes, however, by anything but a brief absence from the
United States.184 This case reveals a growing movement to extend constitu-
tional protections to resident aliens in the interest of fairness.
B. Deportation for Engaging In Terrorist Activity
In American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee v. Meese,185 the District
Court of the Central District of California held that the protections of the
First Amendment applied to aliens within the United States in the context of
deportation proceedings.' 86
Eight individual plaintiffs and ten organizational plaintiffs 8 7 brought suit
against the INS to challenge the constitutionality of the ideological exclusion
provisions of the McCarren-Walter Act' 8 8 and Section 901 of the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act of 1987.189 This case squarely presented the
question of the extent to which resident aliens are entitled to the protections
of the First Amendment, because two of the individuals, Hamide and
Shehadeh, were resident aliens. The INS had arrested and detained eight
aliens in January 1987 because of alleged membership in the Popular Front
for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a splinter group of the Palestine Lib-
eration Organization. The INS claimed that, as members of a group pro-
moting world communism, the detainees were subject to deportation under
the McCarren-Walter Act. This activity would have been protected if com-
mitted by a United States citizen.' 90
quired to register for the draft and to undergo training and service in the armed forces in the
same circumstances as are United States citizens. Id. (citing 50 U.S.C. § 453(a)(1988)).
184. Id. at 522-23.
185. 714 F. Supp. 1060 (C.D. Cal. 1989), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., American-Arab
Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Thornburgh, 940 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1991).
186. Id. at 1063; see Henthorne, supra note 117, at 627-31, for a discussion of the district
court decision.
187. The plaintiffs were as follows: Kader Musa Hamide, Michel Ibrahim Shehadeh,
Basher Amer, Ayman Mustafa Obeid, Julie Nuangugi Mungai, Aiad Khaled Baraket, Naim
Nadim Sharif, Amjad Mustafa Obeid, American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, Arab-
American Democratic Federation, Association of Arab American University Graduates, Irish
National Caucus, Palestine Human Rights Campaign, American Friends Service Committee,
League of United Latin American Citizens, Michel Bogopolsky, Darrel Meyers, and the
Southern Californian Interfaith Task Force on Central America. American-Arab Anti-Dis-
crimination Comm., 714 F. Supp. at 1062.
188. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a)(6)(D), (F)(iii), (G)(v), and (H) (1952), (prior to amendment by
Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978).
189. Pub. L. No. 100-204, § 901, 101 Stat. 1331, 1399 (1987) (amended October 1, 1988)
(repealed 1990). See supra, note 177 and accompanying text for the full text of Section 901.
190. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 714 F. Supp at 1066. The court referred
to a statement made by former F.B.I. director William H. Webster during hearings regarding
his nomination to be Director of the C.I.A. in 1987, to substantiate the Government's admis-
sion that the plaintiffs were deportable under the McCarren-Walter Act's ideological exclusion
provisions. Id. Mr. Webster stated:
[the aliens] were arrested because they are alleged to be members of a world-
wide Communist organization which under the McCarren Act makes them eli-
gible for deportation . . . in this particular case if these individuals had been
United States citizens, there would not have been a basis for their arrest.
Id. (quoting Hearings Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on Nomination of
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Although none of those threatened with deportation had been accused of
any crime and there was no evidence of involvement in terrorist activity as
defined by section 901, the INS sought denial of bail on the basis that the
detainees were a threat to national security because of their involvement in
terrorist activity. Additionally, the INS refused to reveal in open court evi-
dence linking the detainees to the PFLP, which it claimed to have collected
through wiretapping. 191 Citing national security, the INS sought a closed
session in which to introduce this evidence. 192 Judge Roy Daniels refused to
hear the evidence in a closed session, and the detainees were released. 193
The INS dropped the McCarren-Walter Act charges against all eight
aliens on April 23, 1987. The Government then brought charges for techni-
cal, non-ideological violations of the Immigration and Nationality Act
against six of the individuals, 194 and new McCarren-Walter charges against
Hamide and Shehadeh for "being members of or affiliating with an organiza-
tion that advocates or teaches the unlawful damage, injury or destruction of
property."' 195 In April of 1987 Hamide and Shehadeh challenged the consti-
tutionality of the McCarren-Walter provisions. The District Court dis-
missed the suit because Hamide and Shehadeh had not exhausted their
administrative remedies and a direct appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of
William H. Webster, to be Director of Central Intelligence, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 94, 95 (1987)
(statement of William H. Webster).
191. See Ybarra, supra note 1, at AI, A4. An INS Agent lived in the apartment next to
Khader Hamide for eight months prior to his arrest. Id. at Al. The INS admitted to tapping
the phone calls of the defendants and their lawyers, but would not reveal whether this activity
continued as of Nov. 1, 1991. Id. at A4. The Government disclosed that video and audio
surveillance had been conducted in December of 1988 and that the Government on February
19, 1989 submitted a petition seeking a declaration of the legality of the surveillance to the
Federal District Court. United States v. Hamide, 914 F.2d 1147, 1149 (9th Cir. 1990). This
was pursuant to § 1806(0 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1801-1811 (1988) which provides that the Government must generally obtain a court order
before conducting foreign intelligence surveillance within the United States. Id. "The judge
must make specific findings that the application for surveillance is proper, and that probable
cause exists to believe that 'the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power or an
agent of a foreign power.'" Hamide, 914 F.2d at 1149 n.1 (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3)(A)
(1988)). The statute also provides that: "no United States person may be considered a foreign
power or an agent of a foreign power solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first
amendment." 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3)(4) (1988). The District Court found that the surveil-
lance was legally obtained and refused to allow discovery of the applications for the declara-
tion of legality on the final order allowing the surveillance. Hamide, 914 F.2d at 1149-50.
Hamide appealed the district court's decision to the Ninth Circuit which refused jurisdiction
because the court's ruling was not a final order under the statute, which the circuit court read
to define only orders finding illegal surveillance to be final and thus reviewable. Id. at 1150-5 1.
The order, like discovery orders, could only be appealed upon a final order of deportation. Id.
at 1153. Hamide also challenged the surveillance in another proceeding on the ground that it
violated his First Amendment rights. Id. at 1151 n.3. The District Court in that case dis-
missed Hamide's claim for failure to state a claim. Id.
192. Ybarra, supra note 1, at A4.
193. Hamide, 914 F.2d at 1153.
194. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. 714 F. Supp. at 1066 n.6. The six defend-
ants other than Hamide and Shehadeh were charged with overstaying their visa terms under 8
U.S.C. § 125 1(a)(2) (1988). Id. Basher Amer was also charged with "failing to maintain stu-
dent status under 8 U.S.C. § 1215(a)(9)." Id.
195. Id. at 1066 (citing 8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(6)(F)(iii) (1988) (repealed 1990).
19921
SMU LAW REVIEW
Appeals was available. 196 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals also found
that Hamide and Shahedeh had not exhausted their administrative reme-
dies. 197 All eight aliens then applied for District Court review. The District
Court found that it had no jurisdiction over Hamide and Shehadeh's claims
because of the Ninth Circuit decision finding that administrative remedies
had not been exhausted. 198 The other six did have standing, however, be-
cause of the chill that the threat of deportation placed upon expressive activ-
ities protected by the First Amendment.' 99 Because the McCarren-Walter
charges against the six had been dropped and replaced with non-ideological
immigration law violations, the six plaintiffs had to show an authentic inter-
est in engaging in First Amendment activities which would subject them to
deportation under the statute, that the government had a strong interest in
prosecuting them under the statute, and that their First Amendment activi-
ties were chilled by this likelihood of enforcement. 200 The activities that the
plaintiffs were interested in pursuing included "reading and distributing
magazines published by the PFLP, supporting or discussing the PFLP or its
views in public meetings and demonstrations, and raising money to support
these activities. ' 20 1 The court cited the Supreme Court's decision in NAACP
v. Button 202 for the proposition that "'[t]he threat of sanctions may deter
[the lawful exercise of First Amendment rights] ... almost as potently as the
actual application of sanctions.' "203 The court found that the objective
threat posed by enforcement of the McCarren-Walter Act provisions was
"substantiated by past and present concrete instances of prosecution" under
these provisions.204 The court also found that the organizational plaintiffs in
the case had standing to challenge the statutes because they met the Hunt
test.20 5 This test 20 6 requires that: 1) an organizations' members would have
standing; 2) the interests at issue be "germane to the organization's pur-
pose;"' 20 7 and 3) the participation of each member of the organization is not
required by the claim or relief sought.208 The court also relied on the six
individual plaintiffs' lack of an alternate forum in which to bring their chal-
lenge since they were under "a real and immediate threat of deportation, but
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1072-73.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1067.
201. Id.
202. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
203. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm, 714 F. Supp. at 1069 (quoting NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. at 433). The court also stated that: "[p]articularly with pre-enforcement
First Amendment challenges, courts have found standing based, in part, on their sensitivity to
the danger of 'self-censorship[,] a harm that can be realized even without an actual prosecu-
tion.' " Id. at 1069 (quoting Virginia v. American Book Sellers Ass'n. 484 U.S. 383, 392
(1988)) (alteration in original).
204. Id. at 1070.
205. Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
206. American-Arab Anti Discrimination Comm., 714 F. Supp. at 1071-72.
207. Id. (quoting New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 8 (1988)
(quoting Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343)).
208. Id. (citing Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343).
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not an actual deportation, ' '2° 9 in which case they could bring their challenge
to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.2 10 The district court thus decided to
entertain the six plaintiffs' constitutional challenges stating: "[b]ecause the
threat of prosecution can be as effective as an actual prosecution . . . the
Government could effectively quell protected constitutional activity by
threatening, but never instituting, deportation proceedings. 211 Plaintiffs
would be placed between the "'Scylla of intentionally flouting the law and
the Charybdis of foregoing what [they] believe to be constitutionally pro-
tected activity in order to avoid becoming enmeshed in a [deportation
proceeding.']" 212
The Government conceded "that aliens have First Amendment rights, '213
so the question became to what extent those rights could be limited in depor-
tation.21 4 The Government argued that aliens' First Amendment rights "are
drastically limited in the deportation context due to Congress' plenary
power over immigration. '21 5 Judge Wilson's decision ultimately asserted
that aliens within the United States were entitled to full protection under the
First Amendment and that this protection was "not limited in the deporta-
tion arena by the Government's plenary immigration power. ' 2 16 The court
found that Congress' deportation power, as opposed to its exclusionary
power, was bounded by constitutional limitations. 21 7 Further, the court as-
serted that only one decision had addressed aliens' First Amendment rights
in the deportation context: Harisiades v. Shaughnessy.2 18 Judge Wilson cited
Harisiades to support constitutional limitations of Congress' power over im-
migration. 2 19 Judge Wilson relied on Harisiades' assertion that the Court
"had the duty of distinguishing between aliens'. . .'advocacy of political
methods' and their unprotected 'methodical but prudent incitement to vio-
lence.' ",220 Judge Wilson read Harisiades to extend First Amendment pro-
tection to aliens' activities that did not exceed the advocacy of political
methods. 221 Although Harisiade's First Amendment challenge had been un-
successful, Judge Wilson inferred from the Supreme Court's application of
the Dennis test, which was applied to United States citizens, that aliens enjoy
209. Id. at 1074.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974)) (altera-
tions in original). The court changed the language of this quote from "a criminal proceeding"
to "a deportation proceeding." Id. The equation of deportation proceedings to criminal pro-
ceedings is controversial, deportation more often being characterized as civil proceedings. See
Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 39 (1924); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730
(1893).
213. American-Arab Anti-DisCrimination Comm., 714 F. Supp. at 1074.
214. Id. at 1075.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1063.
217. Id. at 1075-76.
218. Id. at 1076 (citing Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952)).
219. Id. at 1078.




First Amendment protections to the same extent as do citizens.222 Judge
Wilson concluded that "[wihile the Court will defer to Congress's plenary
immigration power in the substantive due process area, the Court will not
accord Congress the same amount of deference in the First Amendment
field."
2 2 3
The District Court also rejected the Government's argument that analo-
gized the situation of aliens in the deportation context to the lowered First
Amendment standard applicable to prisoners,2 24 students, 225 and the mili-
tary.2 2 6 The court distinguished these limitations because they only applied
to the individuals within a limited environment (the prison, the school, dur-
ing military service) and did not affect the individual's First Amendment
rights when not within that environment. 227 It would have been "impossible
to adopt for aliens a lower degree of First Amendment protection solely in
the deportation setting without seriously affecting their First Amendment
rights outside that setting."1228 The court then proceeded to examine the
challenged provisions under a First Amendment overbreadth analysis:
" 'whether the enactment reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally
protected conduct.' ",229 The court applied the imminent lawless action test
to the First Amendment freedoms potentially infringed upon by the chal-
lenged statutes. 230 Because the provisions did not distinguish between
speech, which could be prohibited because of its incitement to imminent law-
less action, and protected activities, which merely advocated illegal action in
the future, the court found them to be overbroad. 231 American-Arab Anti-
222. Id.
223. Id. at 1078.
224. Id. at 1081. The Government cited Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974), to show
that "a prisoner retains only those First Amendment rights that are not 'inconsistent with his
status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.'"
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 714 F. Supp. at 1081 (quoting Pell, 417 U.S. at
822).
225. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 714 F. Supp. at 1081 (quoting Tinker v.
Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) ("[S]tudents do
not 'shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gate.' "); (citing Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) ("[Tlhe un-
doubted freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial views in schools and classrooms
must be balanced against the society's countervailing interest in teaching students the bounda-
ries of socially appropriate behavior.")).
226. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 714 F. Supp. at 1081 (citing Parker v.
Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756 (1974) ("[F]or reasons which differentiate military society from civil-
ian society, we think congress is permitted to legislate both with greater breadth and with
greater flexibility when prescribing the rules by which the former shall be governed than it is
when prescribing rules for the latter.")).
227. Id. at 1081.
228. Id.; see id. at 1081-82. Judge Wilson commented that "[s]imply stated, the Govern-
ment's view is that aliens are free to say whatever they wish but the government maintains the
ability to deport them for the content of their speech. To state the proposition is to reject it."
Id. at 1082.
229. Id. at 1082 (quoting Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S.
489, 494 (1982); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 359 n.8 (1983)).
230. Id. at 1083. "Consistent with the First Amendment, the government may only pro-
hibit advocacy 'directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and ...likely to
incite or produce such action.' "Id. (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)).
231. Id.
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Discrimination Committee devoted one footnote to the government's inter-
ests in national security and foreign policy issues arising in the immigration
context.232 The court asserted that the imminent lawless action standard
provides sufficient protection.233 Additionally, the court suggested that de-
portation of individuals because of affiliation or membership in certain orga-
nizations would comport with First Amendment protections "if it is
established that group affiliation posed a legitimate threat to the govern-
ment. '234 The court concluded that:
as long as the Government narrowly tailors its deportation laws to fur-
ther its compelling interests in foreign policy and national security, it
can enact laws, (e.g., espionage or national secrecy laws), that allow for
the deportation of aliens on the basis of their First Amendment activi-
ties. Thus, there is no basis for a lower standard of First Amendment
protection for aliens. 235
This seemingly insignificant footnote signaled the return of the foreign pol-
icy/national security limitation of aliens' First Amendment protections. It
is all the more surprising, set as it is in the midst of the strongest language
advocating full First Amendment protections for aliens since Justice Mur-
phy's concurrence in Bridges v. Wixon.236
The decision in American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. was hailed as
the first substantive extension of full First Amendment protections to aliens
in deportation proceedings. 237
The district court's decision regarding the standing of the plaintiffs and
the ripeness of the issues was appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that the plain-
tiffs had standing, but reversed its decision on the issue of ripeness.238 The
Ninth Circuit found that the factual issues of the case had not been suffi-
ciently developed to allow a judicial decision and that there had been no
opportunity for the INS to present its interpretation of the challenged provi-
sions. 2 39 The appeals court also stressed that
[t]o exercise jurisdiction, in advance of action by the INS, might well
Simply writing, publishing, circulating, distributing, printing, displaying, and
possessing material advocating or teaching the prohibited ideologies cannot be
equated with advocacy of imminent unlawful action. "[T]he mere abstract
teaching of Communist theory, including the teaching of the moral propriety or
even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence, is not the same as prepar-
ing a group for violent action and steeling it to such action."
Id. (quoting Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961)).
232. Id. at 1082 n.18.
233. Id.
234. Id. (citations omitted).
235. Id.
236. 326 U.S. 135, 157-66 (1945) (Murphy, J., concurring); see supra notes 111-16 and
accompanying text.
237. See, e.g. David Cole, Non-Alien Speech: Constitutional Freedoms of Speech & Associa-
tion for Alien Residents, 248 No. 7 THE NATION 220, February 20, 1989; Rules for Deporting
Aliens Espousing World Communism Violate First Amendment, BNA WASH. INSIDER, Feb. 9,
1989.
238. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 940 F.2d 445, 449 (9th Cir. 1991).
239. Id. at 454.
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propel us into contravening the 'basic rationale' of the ripeness doctrine:
the court would become entangled in an abstract disagreement over ad-
ministrative policy and would interfere before any INS decision was
made affecting the parties in any concrete way. 24°
C. Chilling Resident Aliens' Free Speech Rights Through the
Denial of Naturalization
In Price v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Service,241 the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the Attorney General's broad
inquiry into any matters that might affect eligibility for naturalization did
not serve to chill the exercise of First Amendment rights by resident aliens
seeking naturalization.242 John Eric Price was an engineer who had been a
lawful permanent resident of the United States since 1960.243 This case
arose because Price refused to comply with an INS request that he list all
affiliations with any organization, association, fund, foundation, party, club,
society, or similar group in the United States or in any other country or
place. Price refused to answer the question because it violated Price's First
Amendment right of association. 2 " Price did assert that he had not been a
member of or affiliated with any proscribed organization. 245
Price's petition for naturalization was denied by the district court.24 6
Price argued that the Attorney General's authority to inquire into group
membership and affiliation was limited to those organizations listed by Con-
gress which barred an alien from naturalization. The court found that,
under the statutes regulating naturalization, the examination of aliens was
limited to "inquiry concerning the applicant's residence, physical presence in
the United States, good moral character, understanding of and attachment
to the fundamental principles of the Constitution of the United States, ability
to read, write and speak English, and other qualifications to become a natu-
ralized citizen as required by law."' 247 The Attorney General, however,
240. Id.
241. 941 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1991).
242. Id. at 882.
243. See Lisa Stansky, Court OKs Broad Inquiry on Citizenship Applications, THE RE-
CORDER, Aug. 8, 1991, at 1.
244. Price, 941 F.2d at 879.
245. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. 1424(a) § 313 (1988)). Price stated that:
I am not and have not been, within the meaning of the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act, for a period of at least 10 years immediately preceding the date of this
petition, a member of or affiliated with any organization proscribed by such Act,
or any section, subsidiary, branch, affiliate or subdivision thereof, nor have I
during such period believed in, advocated, engaged in, or performed any of the
acts or activities prohibited by such Act.
8 U.S.C. § 1424 prohibits the naturalization of any person falling into the listed classes. Id.
Its language is identical to that used in the former Deportation statute section 1252. Id. See
infra note 276 for the text of § 1251. Section 1182 remains enforce.
246. Id. at 879.
247. Id. at 881 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1443(a) (1988)). The requirements for naturalization are:
1) status as a lawfully admitted permanent resident alien; 2) residence in the United States for
at least five years prior to the filing of the naturalization petition; 3) residence in the United
States for the period between the filing of the petition and admission to citizenship; and,
4) physical presence in the United States for at least half of the required residency period. Id.
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could require an alien to "aver to 'all facts which in the opinion of the Attor-
ney General may be material to the applicant's naturalization,' ",248 and have
INS employees obtain "testimony concerning any matter touching or in any
way affecting the admissibility of any petitioner for naturalization. '249 The
Price court interpreted these grants of authority to permit the Attorney Gen-
eral to make broad inquiries, "as long as they are related in some way to the
naturalization requirements. '250 The court reasoned that an alien might not
know that the organization of which the alien was a member or affiliated
with was a communist front. The alien would not therefore provide this
information if responding only to the specific list of organizations in section
1424(a). 25 1 An alien who did not know that an organization was a commu-
nist front might still be found to have reason to know of this fact, however,
and thereby be prohibited from naturalization. 252 It is only, therefore, by
examining all organizations which an alien has been a member of or affiliated
with that the Attorney General may determine whether the alien had reason
to believe that the organization was a communist front.253 The wide discre-
tion given to the INS was based on the Agency's " 'especially sensitive polit-
ical functions that implicate questions of foreign relations .... " -254
The majority also rejected Price's First Amendment challenge.255
Although the court stated that "[i]t has long been recognized that resident
aliens enjoy the protection of the First Amendment, ' ' 256 the opinion then
asserted that "the protection afforded resident aliens may be limited. '2 57
The court derived support for the limitation of resident aliens' constitutional
protections from a passage in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,258 which
upheld a challenged search of a Mexican citizen's residence in Mexico by
United States officials.259 The Price court read a general discussion of the
constitutional protections applicable to all aliens to apply to permanent resi-
dent aliens within the territories of the United States.260 According to the
Price court, this passage established that
constitutional protection for aliens within the territory of the United
States 'are constitutional decisions of this Court expressly according dif-
fering protection to aliens than to citizens, based on our conclusion that
Additionally, the alien must also not be in any of the classes described in 8 U.S.C. § 1424(a)
(1988). Id.
248. Price, 941 F.2d at 881(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1445(a) (1988))(emphasis omitted).
249. Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1988)) (emphasis omitted).
250. Id.
251. Id. at 885.
252. Id. at 882.
253. Id.
254. Id. (quoting INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110 (1988) (footnotes omitted)).
255. Id. at 884.
256. Id. at 882 (citing Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 n.5 (1953)) (quoting
Bridges, 326 U.S. at 161 (Murphy, J., concurring)); Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S.
306, 309 n.5 (1970) (same quotation); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1222
(9th Cir. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 494 U.S. 259 (1990))).
257. Id. The court cites no direct authority for this proposition.
258. Id. (quoting Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 273).
259. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 261.
260. Price, 941 F.2d at 882 (citing Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 273).
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the particular provisions in question were not intended to extend to
aliens in the same degree as to citizens.26 1
The Price court then stated that the "Court has historically afforded Con-
gress great deference in the area of immigration and naturalization. ' 262 This
deference places decisions to expel or exclude aliens in the political branches
of the Executive or the Legislature, thereby excluding these decisions from
all but the narrowest review because they may implicate foreign policy mat-
ters.263 The court then stated "[i]n the exercise of its broad power over im-
migration and naturalization Congress regularly makes rules that would be
unacceptable if applied to citizens." 2 64The court ultimately applied the
Kleindienst 265 test which held that
when the executive exercises this [exclusionary] power negatively on the
basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason, the courts will neither
look behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by balancing its
justification against the First Amendment interests of those who seek
personal communication with the applicant. 266
Here, the court equated Price's position as applicant for naturalization with
the Kleindienst plaintiffs, United States citizens who challenged the denial of
a non-immigrant visa to a nonresident alien, and reasoned that Price was
entitled to no greater First Amendment protection than were United States
citizens.267 This conclusion ignored the basis of the wide discretion to ex-
clude allowed the Attorney General in Kleindienst: that the decision was one
to exclude a nonresident alien, in which area Congress' and the Executive's
power is least fettered by the judiciary and constitutional limitations. The
court justified this conflation of standards applicable to resident and nonresi-
dent aliens because "the determination of who will become a citizen of the
United States is at least as 'peculiarly concerned with the political conduct of
government' as the decision of who will be allowed to enter, if not more
SO. ' ' 268 The majority concluded that:
[a]lthough a resident alien desiring eventually to petition for naturaliza-
tion may find himself choosing between future citizenship and associa-
tion with groups whose affiliation he does not wish to disclose, once
naturalized he is afforded precisely the same protection of his right to
associate as is a natural born citizen. 269
Circuit Judge Noonan's dissent directly addressed the First Amendment
issue of whether the inquiry itself violated the free exercise of First Amend-
ment rights, stating: "[t]he Immigration Service propounds a question to
persons seeking naturalization that would be intolerable if asked by a gov-
261. Id. (quoting Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 273 (citations omitted)).
262. Id.
263. Id. at 882-83.
264. Id. at 883 (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (citations omitted) (quoting
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976))).
265. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
266. Price, 941 F.2d at 883 (emphasis omitted) (citing Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 770).
267. Id. at 883-84.
268. Id. at 883 (quoting Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954)).
269. Id. at 884-85.
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eminent agency of an American citizen. It is an intimidating question. It
chills the right of free association guaranteed by the First Amendment. '270
Circuit Judge Noonan would have allowed resident aliens full First Amend-
ment protections but with some limitations "in matters which 'may impli-
cate our relations with foreign powers.' ",271 Circuit Judge Noonan claimed
that "[t]he Supreme Court has drawn a firm line between resident and non-
resident aliens."'272 Congress therefore has the exclusive power to define the
protections and status of nonresident aliens but is limited by the First
Amendment with regard to resident aliens. 273
III. THE IMMIGRATION ACT OF 1990: TERRORISM AND FOREIGN
POLICY
A. Rewriting McCarren- Walter
The Immigration Act of 1990274 has been hailed as removing many of the
substantive grounds of exclusion for political belief and association under
which many of the First Amendment challenges to immigration laws were
brought. 275 The 1990 Act has retained, however, a majority of the McCar-
ren-Walter Act's ideological provisions with regard to immigrant aliens. 276
270. Id. at 885 (Noonan, J., dissenting).
271. Id. (quoting Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 476).
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
275. See, e.g., Gail Appleson, Japanese Scholar Challenges McCarthy-Era Blacklist, REU-
TER LIBRARY REPORT, May 24, 1991; Stanley Mailman, Employment Opportunities Under the
New Act, N.Y. L.J. Mar. 22, 1991, at 3; Ronald C. Ostrow, Bush Signs Law Boosting Immigra-
tion by 40%, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 30, 1990 at A39, col.1.
276. 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1990 Supp. II). Section 1251(a)(l)(A) defines excludable aliens as:
"[a]ny alien who at the time of entry or adjustment of status was within one or more of the
classes of aliens excludable by the law existing at such time is deportable." 8 U.S.C.
§ 125 1(a)(1)(A) (1990 Supp. II). In addition, section 125 1(a)(4) and (5) excludes aliens on the
basis of security and public charge grounds. These sections provide:
(4) Security and related grounds
(A) In general
Any alien who has engaged, is engaged, or at any time after entry has engaged
in-
(i) any activity to violate any law of the United States relating to espionage or
sabotage or to violate or evade any law prohibiting the export from the United
States of goods, technology, or sensitive information.
(ii) any other criminal activity which endangers public safety or national se-
curity, or
(iii) any activity a purpose of which is the opposition to, or the control or
overthrow of, the Government of the United States by force, violence, or other
unlawful means, is deportable.
(B) Terrorist activities
Any alien who has engaged, is engaged, or at any time after entry has engaged




An alien whose presence or activities in the United States the Secretary of
State has reasonable ground to believe would have potentially serious adverse
foreign policy consequences for the United States is deportable.
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The Naturalization statute is unaffected by the Immigration Act of 1990 and
continues the McCarron-Walter's Act prohibition against the naturalization
of aliens who support the overthrow of organized government. 277 The Act
(ii) Exceptions
The exceptions described in clauses (ii) and (iii) of section 1182(a)(3)(C) of
this title shall apply to deportability under clause (i) in the same manner as they
apply to excludability under section 11 82(a)(3)(C)(i) of this title.
(D) Assisted in Nazi persecution or engaged in genocide
Any alien described in clause (i) or (ii) of section 1 182(a)(3)(E) of this title is
deportable. (5) Public Charge
Any alien who, within five years after the date of entry, has become a public
charge from causes not affirmatively shown to have arisen since entry is
deportable.
8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4)-(5) (1990 Supp. II).





(I) has engaged in a terrorist activity, or
(II) a consular officer or the Attorney General knows, or has reasonable
ground to believe, is likely to engage after entry in any terrorist activity (as
defined in clause (iii)). is excludable. An alien who is an officer, official, repre-
sentative, or spokesman of the Palestine Liberation Organization is considered,
for purposes of this chapter, to be engaged in a terrorist activity.
(ii) "Terrorist activity" defined
As used in this chapter, the term "terrorist activity" means any activity which
is unlawful under the laws of the place where it is committed (or which, if com-
mitted in the United States, would be unlawful under the laws of the United
States or any State) and which involves any of the following:
(I) The highjacking or sabotage of any conveyance (including an aircraft, ves-
sel, or vehicle).
(II) The seizing or detaining, and threatening to kill, injure, or continue to
detain, another individual in order to compel a third person (including a govern-
mental organization) to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or im-
plicit condition for the release of the individual seized or detained.
(III) A violent attack upon a internationally protected person (as defined in
section 11 16(b)(4) of title 18) or upon the liberty of such a person.
(IV) An assassination.
(V) The use of any-
(a) biological agent, chemical agent, or nuclear weapon or device, or
(b) explosive or firearm (other than for mere personal monetary gain), with
intent to endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of one or more individuals
or to cause substantial damage to property.
(IV) A threat, attempt, or conspiracy to do any of the foregoing.
(iii) "Engage in terrorist activity" defined
As used in this chapter, the term "engage in terrorist activity" means to com-
mit, in an individual capacity or as a member of an organization, an act of ter-
rorist activity or an act which the actor knows, or reasonably should know,
affords material support to any individual, organization, or government in con-
ducting a terrorist activity at any time, including any of the following acts:
(I) The preparation or planning of a terrorist activity.
(II) The gathering of information on potential targets for terrorist activity.
(III) The providing of any type of material support, including a safe house,
transportation, communications, funds, false identification, weapons, explosives,
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retains deportability for membership in a totalitarian party.278 The Act
makes an exception to excludability for involuntary membership, 27 9 past
membership, 280 and for close family members of United States citizens or
lawful permanent residents.2 81 The Attorney General's discretion in the
or training, to any individual the actor knows or has reason to believe has com-
mitted or plans to commit an act of terrorist activity.
(IV) The soliciting of funds or other things of value for terrorist activity or
for any terrorist organization.
(V) The solicitation of any individual for membership in a terrorist organiza-
tion, terrorist government, or to engage in a terrorist activity.
(C) Foreign policy
(i) In general
An alien whose entry or proposed activities in the United States the Secretary
of State has reasonable ground to believe would have potentially serious adverse
foreign policy consequences for the United States is excludable.
(ii) Exception for officials
An alien who is an official of a foreign government or a purported govern-
ment, or who is a candidate for election to a foreign government office during
the period immediately preceding the election for that office, shall not be exclud-
able or subject to restrictions or conditions on entry into the United States under
clause (i) solely because of the alien's past, current, or expected beliefs, state-
ments, or associations, if such beliefs, statements, or associations would be law-
ful within the United States.
(iii) Exception for other aliens
An alien, not described in clause (ii), shall not be excludable or subject to
restrictions or conditions on entry into the United States under clause (i) be-
cause of the alien's past, current, or expected beliefs, statements, or associations
would be lawful within the United States, unless the Secretary of State person-
ally determines that the alien's admission would compromise a compelling
United States foreign policy interest.
Id.
278. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (1990 Supp. II).
279. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(D)(ii). The section provides that:
Clause (i) shall not apply to an alien because of membership or affiliation if the
alien establishes to the satisfaction of the consular officer when applying for a
visa (or to the satisfaction of the Attorney General when applying for admis-
sion) that the membership or affiliation is or was involuntary, or is or was solely
when under 16 years of age, by operation of law, or for purposes of obtaining
employment, food rations, or other essentials of living and whether necessary for
such purposes.
Id.
280. Id. (a)(2)(D)(3). This section provides that:
Clause (i) shall not apply to an alien because of membership or affiliation if the
alien establishes to the satisfaction of the consular officer when applying for a
visa (or to the satisfaction of the Attorney General when applying for admis-
sion) that-
(I) the membership or affiliation terminated at least-
(a) 2 years before the date of such application, or
(b) 5 years before the date of such application, in the case of an alien whose
membership or affiliation was with the party controlling the government of a
foreign state that is a totalitarian dictatorship as of such date, and
(II) the alien is not a threat to the security of the United States.
Id.
281. Id. at (a)(2)(D)(iv). This section provides in full:
EXCEPTION FOR CLOSE FAMILY MEMBERS-The Attorney General
may, in the Attorney General's discretion, waive the application or clause (i) in
the case of an immigrant who is the parent, spouse, son, daughter, brother, or
sister of a citizen of the United States or a spouse, son, or daughter of an alien
lawfully admitted for permanent residence for humanitarian purposes, to assure
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case of close family members is limited in the case of resident aliens to the
spouse, son, or daughter of the resident alien.28 2 This is in contrast to the
broader definition of close family member of a citizen: parent, spouse, son,
daughter, brother, or sister.283 Additionally, the close family member excep-
tion seems to be limited to resident aliens admitted for humanitarian pur-
poses.284  The Act also provides for exclusion of participants in Nazi
persecutions or genocide 285 or anyone likely to become a public charge.286
The Immigration Act of 1990 has added two significant provisions provid-
ing for deportability of resident and nonresident aliens. The first allows ex-
clusion or deportation on foreign policy grounds. 287 The second permits
deportation or exclusion for persons engaged in terrorist activity. 288
Although the 1990 Act has removed the explicitly political grounds for
exclusion established by the McCarren-Walter Act for nonimmigrant aliens,
it has retained the exception for terrorist activity for all aliens.289 The ter-
rorist activity provisions of the 1990 Act were drawn from Section 901 of the
family unity, or when it is otherwise in the public interest if the alien is not a





285. Id. at (a)(2)(E)(i). This section provides that:
any alien who, during the period beginning on March 23, 1933, and ending on
May 8, 1945, under the direction of, or in association with-
(I) the Nazi government of Germany,
(II) any government in any area occupied by the military forces of the Nazi
government of Germany,
(III) any government established with the assistance or cooperation of the Nazi
government of Germany, or
(IV) any government which was an ally of the Nazi government of Germany,
ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any
person because of race, religion, national origin, or political opinion is
excludable.
(ii) PARTICIPATION IN GENOCIDE-Any alien who has engaged in con-
duct that is defined as genocide for purposes of the International Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide is excludable.
Id.
286. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(5) (Supp. I 1990). This section provides that: "Any alien who,
within five years after the date of entry, has become a public charge from causes not affirma-
tively shown to have arisen since entry is deportable." Id.
287. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4)(C) (Supp. 11 1990). See supra note 276 for text of this section.
288. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4)(B) (Supp. I 1990). See supra note 276 for text of this section.
289. 8 U.S.C. Section 1251(a)(4)(B) (Supp. II 1990). "Any alien who has engaged, is en-
gaged, or at any time after entry has engaged in any terrorist activity (as defined in section
1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) of this title) is deportable." Id. Section 1182 (a)(3)(B)(iii) provides:
(iii) "ENGAGE IN TERRORIST ACTIVITY DEFINED"-As used in
this Chapter, the term 'engage in terrorist activity' means to commit, in an indi-
vidual capacity or as a member of an organization, an act of terrorist activity or
an act which the actor knows, or reasonably should know, affords material sup-
port to any individual, organization, or government in conducting a terrorist
activity at any time, including any of the following acts:
(I) The preparation or planning of a terrorist activity.
(II) The gathering of information on potential targets for terrorist activity.
(III) The providing of any type of material support, including a safe house,
transportation, communications, funds, false identification, weapons, explosives,
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Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1987.290 Section 901's provision re-
garding terrorist activity was much more narrowly drawn than that con-
tained in the 1990 Act. Under section 901, terrorist activity was defined as
activities which resulted in or had a substantial risk of resulting in serious
bodily harm to persons not involved in armed hostilities.2 9 1 In contrast, the
Immigration Act of 1990 defined terrorist activity as encompassing a wide
range of activities, including recruiting members or providing material sup-
port to a suspected terrorist organization. 292 Section 901's provision had
allowed the continued exclusion and deportation of aliens on the basis of
association with or membership in organizations which have engaged in ter-
rorist activities.293 Implementation of the terrorism provisions under ex-
isting naturalization and deportation procedures will likely result in the
same wide-sweeping inquiry justified by the McCarren-Walter Act.29 4
Whether the incidence of terrorism in the United States justifies the wide
ranging terrorism exceptions is not clear.295 According to F.B.I. figures,
fifty-three incidents of domestic terrorism occurred from 1985 to 1989.296
The Act's exception from First Amendment protection for aliens consid-
ered to be adverse to foreign policy is contained in Section 125 l(a)(4)(C).2 9 7
or training, to any individual the actor knows or has reason to believe has com-
mitted or plans to commit an act of terrorist activity.
(IV) The soliciting of funds or other things of value for terrorist activity or
for any terrorist organization.
(V) The solicitation of any individual for membership in a terrorist organiza-
tion, terrorist government, or to engage in a terrorist activity.
8 U.S.C. § 1l82(a)(3)(B)(iii) (Supp. 11 1990).
290. Pub. L. No. 100-204, § 901, 101 Stat. 1331, 1399-1400 (1987) (amended 1988) (re-
pealed 1990). See supra note 177 for the text of § 901.
291. See supra note 287, for the Act's definition of terrorist activity.
292. Id.
293. Id. See Cole, supra note 2, at 22, for a discussion of the use of the terrorist activity
provision of § 901 to exclude aliens on the basis of association.
294. See Cole, supra note 2, at 22; Ashley Dunn, McCarthy-Era Legacy Survive With U.S.
Government Blacklist, THE HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Oct. 31, 1991, at A9; Bruce Fein, Foreign
Policy Miscue, THE WASH. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1990, at G2. The Bush Administration has pro-
posed a secret deportation tribunal for aliens suspected of terrorism in which the evidence
against an alien would be disclosed to the alien only in a summary form, or not at all, on the
basis of national security, U.S. foreign relations, important investigatory techniques, or confi-
dential source concerns. Bruce Fein, Improving on a Terrorist Idea, TEX. LAW., July 1, 1991,
at 17. Although this particular proposal was abandoned on June 20, 1991, a more moderate
version is in the drafting stage. Id. The rationale behind this provision is to avoid exposing
intelligence methods and infiltrators. Id.
295. Fein, supra note 294 at 17.
296. Id. The purpose of the special deportation proceeding would thus seem to be mainly
directed toward the control of terrorism in foreign countries. Id.
297. 8 U.S.C.§ 1251(a)(4)(C) (Supp. 11 1990). This section provides:
(i) In General
An alien whose presence or activities in the United States the Secretary of State
has reasonable ground to believe would have potentially serious adverse foreign
policy consequences for the United States is deportable.
(ii) Exceptions
The exceptions described in clauses (ii) and (iii) of § 1182(a)(3)(C) of this title
shall apply to deportability under clause (i) in the same manner as they apply to
excluability [sic] under section 1182 (a)(3)(C)(i) of this title.
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This Section provides that an alien is deportable if the Secretary of State
reasonably believes that the aliens "presence or activities ... would have
potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences . ,,298 The discre-
tion given to the Secretary of State to exclude non-immigrant aliens on the
basis of foreign policy considerations is limited however, by Section
1182(a)(3)(C)(iii), which provides that:
[a]n alien.., shall not be excludable or subject to restrictions or condi-
tions on entry into the United States under clause (i) because of the
alien's past, current, or expected beliefs, statements, or associations, if
such beliefs, statements, or associations would be lawful within the
United States, unless the Secretary of State personally determines that
the alien's admission would compromise a compelling United States
foreign policy interest. 299
This limitation was included within the 1990 Act because of Congressional
concern over the broad discretion which the Foreign Policy section appeared
to grant to the Secretary of State.
B. The Future of First Amendment Protections for Resident Aliens: The
Substantial Connection Test of Verdugo-Urquidez
In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,30 0 the Court stated that "aliens re-
ceive constitutional protections when they have come within the territory of
the United States and developed substantial connections with this coun-
try. 30 1 The first section of this Comment examined the structure estab-
lished by the sovereignty of the nation and its relations to aliens. The second
section discussed the later use of these concepts in the context of the expul-
sion and restriction of resident aliens through ideological provisions. The
final section addressed the return of the sovereign's responsibility for na-
tional security in the form of restrictions based on association with groups
deemed to be terrorist. The 1990 Act represents the United States most re-
cent statement of immigration policy. It was introduced in order to rid the
immigration laws of the anachronistic McCarren-Walter provisions which
allowed for denial of naturalization and deportation on the basis of aliens'
thoughts, beliefs, and expressive activities. The Act, however, has retained
many of the ideological provisions for deportation and denial of naturaliza-
tion. The constitutional protections of the 1990 Act, additionally, as in Sec-
tion 901, are not applicable to resident aliens who are by definition
immigrant aliens. These protections apply to immigrants only in the context
of the foreign policy provision.
298. Id.
299. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(C)(iii) (Supp. 11 1990).
300. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
301. Id. at 271. The court stated that the First, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments,
the Just Compensation Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause have been held to extend to
aliens within the territory of the United States. (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 211-12
(1982); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 (1953); Bridges, 326 U.S. at 148;
Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481 (1931); Wong Wing v. United States,
163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
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The terrorist provision of the Act is subject to wide ranging use to deport
and deny naturalization to resident aliens on the basis of expressive activities
running counter to United States interests which would be protected if com-
mitted by a United States citizen.
The Act of 1990 thus retains the distinction between citizens and nonci-
tizens for the purposes of free speech protection under the First
Amendment.

